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Introduction
This paper describes, in brief, some of the problems
related to human behavior in cyberspace, possible new
crimes, the collection of digital data for the purposes of
evidence, and the archiving of digital data. In a big
organization, it is possible to see the results of
unlimited human behaviour on world network space –
the internet. Current efforts to control this environment
are far from successful, in particular the struggle
against anti-social activities, as well as for the collection
and archiving of data. It has to be recognized that the
application of laws in relation to the internet are
contradictory. Single governments attempt to limit
criminal activities on the internet, but the results are
not, and cannot be satisfactory. The reasons include:
lack of unity, legal incompatibility, different goals, and
the possibilities and sometime wishes of some
governments to use the internet as a battlefield. A
significant problem for organizations is the drafting of
laws that do not take into account the consequences
that follow. An example is the law passed in Germany,
Strafrechtsänderungsgesetz zur Bekämpfung der
Computerkriminalität (41. StrÄndG),1 especially the
provisions of section 202c, which reads (Section 202a is
presented because section 202c refers to section 202c):
§ 202a Ausspähen von Daten
(1) Wer unbefugt sich oder einem anderen Zugang zu
Daten, die nicht für ihn bestimmt und die gegen
unberechtigten Zugang besonders gesichert sind,
unter Überwindung der Zugangssicherung
verschafft, wird mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu drei
Jahren oder mit Geldstrafe bestraft.
(2) Daten im Sinne des Absatzes 1 sind nur solche,
die elektronisch, magnetisch oder sonst nicht
unmittelbar wahrnehmbar gespeichert sind oder
übermittelt werden.
§ 202a Data espionage
(1) Whosoever, without authorisation, obtains access
to data for himself or another, which is not
intended for him and which was protected against
unauthorized access by overcoming the
protection, shall be punished with a term of
imprisonment of up to three years or with fine.
(2) Data in the sense of the Subsection (1) shall only
be those that are stored or transmitted
electronically or magnetically or otherwise in a
manner that is not directly perceptible.
§ 202c Vorbereiten des Ausspähens und Abfangens
von Daten
(1) Wer eine Straftat nach § 202a oder § 202b
vorbereitet, indem er
1. Passwörter oder sonstige Sicherungscodes, die
den Zugang zu Daten (§ 202a Abs. 2) ermöglichen,
oder
2. Computerprogramme, deren Zweck die Begehung
einer solchen Straftat ist, herstellt, sich oder
einem anderen verschafft, verkauft, einem
anderen überlässt, verbreitet oder sonst
zugänglich macht, wird mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu
einem Jahr oder mit Geldstrafe bestraft.
(2) § 149 Abs. 2 und 3 gilt entsprechend.
§ 202c StGB The preparation of espionage and
interception of data
(1) Whosoever prepares a criminal offence according
to the terms of § 202a or § 202b by
manufacturing, obtaining for himself or another,
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1 Geltung ab 11.08.2007; G. v. 07.08.2007 BGBl. I S.
1786 (Amending Act to the criminal code to combat
computer fraud (41. Amendatory act to the criminal
code)) dated 7 August 2007, in force from
11.08.2007. Translation with the help of Dr Martin
Eßer, a member of the Editorial Board of the Digital
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review.
selling, providing access to others, distributing or
otherwise making available
1. passwords or other security codes, which provide
access to data (§ make 202a (2)), or
2. computer programs, which serve to commit such
criminal offence, shall be punished with a fine or a
custodial sentence of up to a year.
(2) § 149 Subsection 2 and 3 apply accordingly.
This law significantly reduced the scope of the work
undertaken by IT security companies and experts,
because they can be now punished as criminals if they
use tools that may be used for crimes. Similar laws are
also under preparation in a number of countries. It
seems that such laws may be counter productive,
because it is possible to use current laws with slight
modifications and without the unwanted results.2
Human behavior in cyberspace 
We can fully see the phenomenon of Dr. Jekyll and Mr.
Hyde on the internet. What people cannot allow
themselves to do in the physical world, they do over the
internet without any inhibition. Examples include blogs
and chat rooms in which people make outrageous
statements about each other, use rude words, and
indulge in virtual sex and such like; however, such
behaviour cannot be considered to be correct.3 This
phenomenon desensitizes the person. As an example,
we can demonstrate pilferage undertaken by game
players. This pilferage is the theft of a player’s accounts.
When a person commits fraud in virtual reality, it is
possible to be fraudulent in the physical world, and vice
versa. These problems are far from being tackled.
Games are played on black servers in countries out of
our legal control; software is copied, as well as movies
and music. In addition, virtual cities and lives are
created, and a great deal can be found in this
environment: murder, fraud and sex.
The possibility of new crimes 
The market adopts new products whose effect on the
lives of people cannot be fully estimated immediately.
As an example, consider AVS (Audio Visual Stimulation)
devices. When working as a standalone device, it can be
a useful assistant for a person with mental problems,
but when connected to a networked personal computer,
it is possible to obtain another impression. It is possible
to upload modified software which can evoke later, for
example, an epileptic fit and mood change. It is possible
to manually edit such programs or download them.
These devices have an influence directly on brain waves,
and so they have an influence on brain activity. When
and if such devices exist and they are sold, it is to be
expected that they will be misused. It is also possible to
attack medical devices, such as remote robotic surgery.
The first experiments were undertaken via highly secure
optical links; later experiments were undertaken via
virtual private networks over the internet by way of a
common user carrier with a lower level of security. But
internet lines can be attacked, for example by DDoS
(Distributed Denial of Service), and the consequences
can be serious for health and life. Hospital networks can
be the target of external or internal attacks, just as the
networks of other organizations, both public and
private. There are good forensic techniques for the
standard computer environment, but there are no
procedures for non-typical medical devices, where non-
standard operating systems are installed with non-
standard peripherals.
Models and guidelines for first responders
The police are very often in a position of a passive
witness, because of the higher volumes of the use of
modern technology. It is almost impossible for a single
person to be familiar with every electronic device
currently in use. The other problem is a shortage of
highly qualified staff; people who know where to look
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2 For a number of articles on this topic, see
http://www.zdnet.co.uk/tsearch/uk+hi+cybercrime.
htm.
4 For instance, see MUDr. Karel Nešpor, CSc., PhDr.
Ladislav Csémy, Zdravotní rizika počítačových her a
videoher, 14.11.2007 (Health risks of computer
games and video games), available at
http://www.babinet.cz/podlupou.php?id=3813.
When working as a standalone device, it can be a useful
assistant for a person with mental problems, but when
connected to a networked personal computer, it is
possible to obtain another impression.
for evidence and how to secure it.4 The other very
important point is that very often law enforcement units
do not recognize that criminals are ahead of them and
sometime their actions cause fatal mistakes.5 This
means there is a need to focus on guidelines or models
and procedures for law enforcement units. Some
guidelines have already been prepared.6 The guidelines
for police staff include the following trends:
1. The authors of guidelines are experienced
policemen who are also familiar with digital
evidence specialists. This is illustrated in the
inclusion of such topics as the general seizure of
evidence, which means that, for example,
fingerprints and other classical evidence must be
taken into consideration - so it is necessary to
protect the keyboard and other peripheral devices,
which a lay person may not consider necessary.
This is because some chemicals used during the
seizure process can destroy electronic equipment.
2. Although the authors tend to be experienced
digital evidence specialists, the material does not
appear to be prepared in close cooperation with
experienced policemen. This means that such
guidance is focused on IT problems and set-up
procedures when investigating electronic devices,
but omits to consider that there can be valuable
evidence on other devices which can be very
important, for example, to discover an identity of
the last user.
3. A common attribute of nearly all the guidelines is
an absence of technological procedures. For
instance, it means that memory cards should not
be exposed to an electrostatic field, or low
temperature (frost can reliably erase data stored
on electronic devices; for instance, codes in car
radios are possible to erase by a short period of
time in a freezer: -10oC is sufficient).
Guidelines, especially for first responders, might
usefully be created in combination with the police,
digital evidence specialists and technology experts.7 Out
of necessity, such procedures must be monitored and
regularly updated. In my experience, it is necessary in
the case of an action within a company, that it is
essential that a digital evidence specialist will be on site
to save evidence with minimum effect on the daily
business.
The importance of digital evidence cannot be over
estimated. Digital evidence can provide a lead to other
evidence, and can corroborate other forms of evidence.
Digital evidence can be direct evidence, such as
documents or traces of internet activity, if the evidence
is well documented and directly related to the person
under suspicion or the company. Such digital evidence
must be seized in a manner that is legally acceptable
and with the minimum amount of changes. Where
evidence is altered, any changes must be accounted for.
It is necessary to prove that the evidence is identical to
what was received, and the analysis should be
repeatable. This means that the entire process must be
carried out to achieve maximum credibility from the
point of view of data collection, storing, analysis and
must be repeatable. Results obtained must be
translated into a language that is easily understandable
for the lay person. The presentation itself must also be
easy to understand and without loss of important data.
Identifying the user identification
Digital evidence is often a relationship between the
evidence and a person or a number of people. This
relationship is not close, and so the credibility of the
evidence of linking a person to a particular act or
document can be low. It is usual for the link between
identifying the user of a computer or device and the
person that was actually responsible for the action is
not very strong, especially on home PCs. For example, e-
mail boxes that can be viewed via a web interface can
be, and are modified. This means it is difficult to
guarantee the content of an e-mail. Hackers can
penetrate computers by using malicious software and
obtain access to mailboxes and other places without
any knowledge of the owner or user of a PC. This means
the credibility of digital evidence can be decreased very
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4 See, for example, Andy McCue, ‘Police forces lack
e-crime expertise and resources’, Silicon.com, 18
March 2008 10:00 GMT,
http://www.silicon.com/ciojury/0,3800003161,3917
0382,00.htm.
5 Další zbraň proti bossu Starkovi – hacker, 20.
listopadu 2007 1:39 (Another weapon against boss
Starka - hacker) at http://zpravy.idnes.cz/dalsi-
zbran-proti-bossu-starkovi-hacker-f08-
/krimi.asp?c=A071119_215401_krimi_mia; for a list
of article relating to hacking, see
http://www.krab.cz/index.php?co_je=hacker%20
%5Bhekr%5D.
6 See the most recent version of the English police
guide, Good Practice Guide for Computer Based
Electronic Evidence (Association of Chief Police
Officers, 2008), http://www.acpo.police.uk/asp/
policies/Data/ACPO%20Guidelines%20v18.pdf;
NIJ Special report, Forensic Examination of Digital
Evidence, A Guide for Law Enforcement (US
Department of Justice, Office of Justice Program,
National Institute of Justice, April 2004),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-
sum/199408.htm; K M Waggoner, editor,
Handbook of Forensic Services (US Department of
Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Laboratory
Division, 2007), http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/
handbook/forensics.pdf; Guidelines for best
practice in the forensic examination of digital
technology (IOCE, May 2002),
http://www.ioce.org/fileadmin/user_upload/2002/i
oce_bp_exam_digit_tech.html.
7 Although see Peter Sommer, Directors & Corporate
Advisors’ Guide to Digital Investigations and
Evidence (IAAC, 2005),
http://www.iaac.org.uk/Default.aspx?tabid=65 and
Electronic Crime Scene Investigation: A Guide For
First Responders (US Department of Justice, Office
of Justice Program, July 2001),
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/187736.pdf.
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simply. Generally, identity management is not a simple
matter, and to establish a credible and provable
authorization and authentication is a complex matter.
Even biometric measurements are not reliable, because
much depends on the type of sensor used. For instance,
to obtain access to the system using a capacity based
fingerprints sensor, it is often enough to simply breathe
on the surface of the sensor. Even the use of a digital
signature cannot be considered as perfectly reliable,8
and a digital signature does not prove that the private
key was actually used by the owner of the private key.
Digital evidence archiving 
As with other paper documents, so it is necessary for an
organization to archive digital documents. But there are
some differences in the digital world. The archiving does
not just mean the secure storage of data, but also the
need to ensure data readability and accessibility. It very
often means not only to maintain documents and other
data, but also the application that makes it possible to
obtain access to the data. This is a problem which is not
easily solved and which will increasingly become
problematic in the future. Archiving of digital evidence is
mentioned in RFC 3227,9 where the problem is treated in
a perfunctory manner:
4.2 Where and how to Archive
If possible commonly used media (rather than some
obscure storage media) should be used for archiving.
Access to evidence should be extremely restricted,
and should be clearly documented. It should be
possible to detect unauthorized access.
This description demonstrates the authors are not
aware of the issues at all. There is a significant
difference between using back-up tapes for the
purposes of disaster recovery and the long term
archiving of data. In my experience, on several
occasions we have not been able, even after 10 years, to
read data from old data carriers, such as 5.25 inch
floppy disks and old tapes. It is necessary to adopt a
systematic approach in this area, and there are only a
few attempts to do some work in the field.10 It is
important to consider long term conservation of
documents in digital format, both documents that are
scanned versions of paper documents, and documents
created in digital format, because laws and regulations
require the retention of documents, such as data
concerning employees and accounting papers. The
amount of data is permanently increasing.11 Sooner or
later we will have to deal with the practical problem of
how to read and maintain old digital data.
From the perspective of running a large organization,
it is interesting to note how some companies selling
storage solutions provide certificates claiming that the
data stored on their devices will be retained for 100
years, but the reality shows that after three years, there
are some problems with obtaining access to and
reading data from such ‘certified’ carriers. In addition,
standards are changing rapidly, and very often obsolete
standards are very quickly forgotten and there is no
hardware or software to enable data to be viewed and
processed. But there are also other risks. Some
applications use non-standard databases or other
means to store data, and without the applications, the
user is not able to obtain access to and read the data.
And application problem is that applications usually
depends on operating system. Within 10 years we
change it roughly twice in our organization, so it can
happen that an application will be incompatible with an
operating system and we shall not be able to recover
any data. Without a proper application, we would lose
the ability to obtain access to data. In addition, it means
that not only data but applications, too, can be a very
important point in respect of archiving data.
The device also has an influence on archiving digital
evidence. The US courts have already had to deal with
such a problem, as in the case of PHE, Incorporated dba
Adam & Eve v Department of Justice,12 where PHE were
ordered to review information contained in a database,
even though no program existed to enable them to
obtain the information requested by the Department of
Justice.13 The other risk is where data might be
inadvertently destroyed when trying to reconstruct data.
This leads to the conclusion that proper models and
procedures will be helpful in how to maintain data for
the future. Ideally, such models should be standardized
and commonly usable.
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10 For a discussion of the problems in the legal
context, Stephen Mason, Electronic Evidence:
Disclosure, Discovery & Admissibility (LexisNexis
Butterworths, 2007), 4.27-4.35, and for a list of
organizations working on this problem see
Stephen Mason, Proof of the Authenticity of a
Document in Electronic Format Introduced as




11 For the most recent discussion, see John F. Gantz,
project director, The Diverse and Expanding Digital




12 139 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1991).
13 Stephen Mason, Electronic Evidence: Disclosure,
Discovery & Admissibility (LexisNexis
Butterworths, 2007), 2.05.
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As an example, please note part of the form used for
evidence archiving in table 1. The form ought to be
compiled by the lawyer and the IT specialist. We should
know if it is possible to reconstruct such data, and how
to reconstruct it. In addition, there are some documents
with electronic signatures and must be readable and
accessible in the future, if only because they are of
higher importance.14
We have to decide now what to do with the vast
amount of data we are accumulating, and the effect that
a potential loss of data will have in the future. To finish,
to use old Latin, ‘Videant consules….’ (.... Let the
Consuls see to it that no harm befall the State).
© Zden_k Bla_ek, 2008
Archiving of digital evidence
Time period of data request 30 years 20 years 15 years 5 years
Risk rating if data is missing Very High High Low Minimum
Whether data is stored abroad No Yes If yes, where?
Whether a solution for archiving
exists abroad
No Yes If yes, which
one? Specify
Whether a local solution exist 
for archiving
No Yes If yes, which
one? Specify
Data importance from historical
point of view
High Medium Low
Data importance from legal
point of view
High Medium Low
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14 Stefanie Fischer-Dieskau and Daniel Wilke,
‘Electronically signed documents: legal
requirements and measures for their long-term
conservation’, Digital Evidence and Electronic
Signature Law Review, 3 (2006) 40 – 44.
Table 1 Part of a form accompanying the procedure for evidence archiving request
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